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INTRODUCTION 
Hobbes’s definition and use of the term ‘liberty’ has been and continues to be the
subject of much debate within Hobbes scholarship. The change in definition from
De Cive1 to Leviathan2 is one such focus of commentary;3 another is his purported
change in definition between applications of ‘liberty’ to the state of nature and to
civil society.4 Other commentators also discuss his use in Leviathan of more than
one meaning for the term.5 The focus of a recent study is Hobbes’s purported
rejection of the rich ‘republican’ traditional understanding of liberty, in order to
champion a radically restricted application of the term to mean nothing more than
the absence of external impediments to one’s actions.6 In this article I examine
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Hobbes’s use of the notion of liberty, paying particular attention to its place in his
theory of rights. My argument is that in describing the rights that individuals hold,
Hobbes can be seen to be employing the notion of liberty to cover more than the
restrictive definition of the absence of external impediments, and that this broader
understanding of liberty should not be put down to simple inconsistency on
Hobbes’s part. 
In the second part of the article I consider the Hohfeldian analysis of rights,7 and
in particular the dominance of the treatment of the notion of a claim as foundational
for the notion of a right that, I argue, has been for many a legacy of the application
of that analysis. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, ‘Hohfeld’s claim-right is generally
regarded as coming closest to capturing the concept of individual rights used in
political morality’.8 This is very much the case in Hobbes scholarship as well as in
political philosophy more broadly. Jean Hampton, for example, in her justly famous
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition,9 calls on Hohfeld’s analysis to discuss
Hobbesian rights and says that ‘in trying to understand Hobbes’s use of the notion
of a right … we must begin by making use of the well-known analysis of this notion
by the American legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld’.10 She mentions the four categories
or notions of right as defined by Hohfeld and then remarks, ‘The notion of a right
as a claim is perhaps the most common and natural concept that the word “right”
has been taken to cover’.11 And Mathew Kramer, in his penetrating discussion of
rights theory ‘Rights without Trimmings’,12 sets out the Hohfeldian view as being
that a ‘right or claim … is the legal position created through the imposing of a duty
on someone else’.13 While he is in the process of providing an exposition of
Hohfeld’s analytical scheme, Kramer uses the term ‘right’ in a way that sometimes
implies his own acceptance of the notion of a claim as foundational for that of a
right. 
A couple of examples may help to illustrate this. In turning from discussing
Hohfeld’s notion of a claim (which term Kramer, following Hohfeld, uses
interchangeably with right) to setting out his (Hohfeld’s) notion of a liberty, Kramer
says that ‘one’s actions or inactions grounded in liberties are effectively protected—
to a considerable extent—by rights that do not pertain specifically to those actions
or inactions’. He then reiterates, ‘Indeed, in almost every situation outside the
Hobbesian state of nature, conduct in accordance with a liberty will receive at least
a modicum of protection through a person’s basic rights’.14 Here he could be said to be
using ‘rights’ to mean actual moral or political rights as distinct from liberties, which
fall short of being rights proper. This might not signify any more than a tendency
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to use the word ‘right’ to cover both claim and right in a more general sense,
however, and Kramer does make it clear that his intention is to remain true to
Hohfeld’s analysis and not to choose between his categories. But even so, a
commentator like Kramer, who purports to make no preference between the four
Hohfeldian categories of ‘right’ (in other words, he accepts that no one of the four
categories defines a right any more than the others), does nevertheless, in his use
of the language of rights, imply that ‘claim’ rather than ‘liberty’ can be substituted for
‘right’, and therefore implies that it comes closest to our common understanding
of a right. 
It could be argued that for Kramer, this does not amount to much; and that he
is very careful to remain true to Hohfeld’s analysis and to treat each category of
right as a simple legal position and not to give any one category preference over
any other. My other two examples, however, of Waldron and Hampton, do illustrate
a tendency, found in many writers, to treat the Hohfeldian claim as coming closest
to our common understanding of a moral or political right. The implication of this
is that the notion of a claim is foundational for that of a right. 
My suggestion, in the second part of the article, is that there may be
disadvantages to seeing the notion of a claim as foundational for the notion of a
right, and that some of these are thrown into relief by Hobbes’s earlier use of the
notion of liberty as foundational for the idea of a right. In light of this, it is worth
considering whether the notion of liberty might be more effective than that of a
claim to ground our notion of a right. Equally, it is worth considering whether using
the notion of liberty might be more effective than failing to choose any of Hohfeld’s
categories as coming closest to our common understanding of a moral or political
right.
BACKGROUND
The notion of liberty is of course central to Hobbes’s political theory. Recent work
on his understanding of liberty has once again raised the issue of whether and to
what extent he intends to restrict the meaning of liberty to the mere ‘absence of
externall Impediments’,15 and what implications this has for his relationship to the
rich history of ‘republican liberty’ and to the history of the development of the
notion of subjective right in the writings of the scholastics.16 Quentin Skinner,
developing a longrunning theme of his writing, argues that Hobbes undertakes an
‘epoch-making effort to discredit the republican theory of liberty …’17 and that he
‘developed this line of argument in conscious reaction to the republican theory of
liberty’.18
Blinded by the Light of Hohfeld: Hobbes’s Notion of Liberty 87
15 Leviathan (n 2) ch 14, 189.
16 See eg Brett (n 5); Matthew H Kramer, ‘Freedom, Unfreedom and Skinner’s Hobbes’ (2001) 9(2)
Journal of Political Philosophy 204; Skinner (n 6). 
17 Skinner (n 6) 212.
18 Ibid, 211.
The republican theory of liberty to which Skinner is alluding, is that which
‘originated in classical antiquity, and lay at the heart of the Roman republican
tradition of public life’. The theory ‘was later enshrined in the Digest of Roman law,
and still later became associated with the city-republics of Renaissance Italy’.19 It is
a theory of human freedom that sets up a sharp dichotomy between freedom and
servitude or slavery. In the Digest this is expressed in an early passage as the
contention that ‘the chief distinction in the law of persons is that all men are either
free or else are slaves’.20
The decisive factor in determining freedom or servitude is, according to the
theory, whether or not one is subject to the arbitrary will of another. One is either
in one’s own power or under the power of another. The mere fact of being under
the power of another is what reduces one’s status from that of free-man to that of
slave. The important element to stress here is that one’s freedom or liberty is
automatically lost once one is under another’s power. Republican liberty is
characterised by Philip Pettit as ‘the ideal of political freedom as non-domination’.21
He argues that there are two themes that distinguish the theory:
First, the argument that a person who is the slave or subject of another is unfree, even if
that other never acts against them. And, second, the argument that so far as the law of
the land is non-arbitrary … to that extent it does not itself take away people’s freedom.22
Skinner draws out the following implication, which is critical for his argument
against Hobbes’s theory of liberty, as he sees it: 
One crucial implication is that liberty can be lost or forfeited even in the absence of any
acts of interference. The lack of freedom suffered by slaves is not a consequence of their
being hindered in the exercise of their desires. Slaves whose choices happen never to
conflict with the will of their master may be able to act without the least interference.
They nevertheless remain wholly bereft of their liberty. They remain subject to the will
of their master, unable to act according to their own independent will at any time. They
are, in other words, not genuine agents at all.23
Emphasising, as it does, human liberty as freedom from domination by the arbitrary
power of others, rather than merely the freedom from (external) impediments to
doing what one has a will to do, does indeed seem strikingly opposed to Hobbes’s
adoption of such a restricted use of the term. 
Skinner’s main thesis is that Hobbes deliberately and overtly attacked the
republican understanding of political liberty as freedom from the arbitrary power of others
and replaced it with his restricted notion of liberty as the absence of external
impediments. In doing this Hobbes set in train a new political understanding of
liberty as simply a lack of (external) interference. This understanding of liberty is
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still hugely influential today and is, perhaps, most famously expressed in Isaiah
Berlin’s notion of ‘negative liberty’.24 This notion, simply put, is freedom from the
interference of others. I am free to walk down the road if no one prevents me from
walking down the road or stops me as I walk and prevents me from walking any
further. In its political application, negative freedom has usually been seen as the
freedom of individuals from undue interference by the state. If I was required by law
to produce identity papers, for example, before I was able to walk down the road,
then I would not be free in that sense. Or, if women were not allowed to walk
unaccompanied in public places, then I would lack this kind of negative freedom.
(Berlin, of course, contrasted it with positive freedom, which has often been
characterised as ‘freedom to’ rather than the ‘freedom from’ of negative liberty and
is usually seen, in a political context, as implying an obligation on the state to
provide what is required to enable or empower citizens to act freely.) Negative
freedom has come to be seen as particularly attached to liberal political theory. 
It might be worth repeating here that, according to Skinner’s interpretation,
Hobbes’s notion of liberty is not simple negative liberty, as briefly outlined above,
but rather a super-restrictive form of negative liberty, that sees it as comprising
nothing more than the literal absence of physical obstacles to what I have a will to
do. So, as in the example above, according to Skinner, Hobbes does not think that
I lack the liberty to walk down the road if there is a law stating that I must show my
identity papers first. It is only if there is a policeman/soldier physically preventing
me from walking that I am unfree. Or if I am bound and unable to move, then I am
unfree. The law itself cannot make me unfree. Indeed, even a gun pointed at my
head does not make me unfree, because I can still choose to walk (and risk being
shot).25 Now it might be clearer what the political implications are, for such a
restrictive understanding of liberty. It means that one could live in a totalitarian
state or police state and still, on this account, be ‘free’.
The contrast between the classical republican notion of liberty and the modern
liberal notion of negative liberty is a fascinating one and raises many questions about
the reasons for Hobbes’s hostility towards the republican theory of liberty.
Unfortunately there is not the space here to discuss this in any detail. 
Skinner supports the argument that Hobbes’s view of liberty is ‘stark in its
simplicity’,26 claiming as it does that ‘to be free is simply to be unhindered from
moving in accordance with one’s natural powers, so that human agents lack freedom
of action if and only if some external impediment makes it impossible for them to
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perform an action that would otherwise be within their powers’.27 Yet he traces
Hobbes’s argument in another way as well, as an attack on the republican view of
liberty, which (taking a surprising twist), rather than pointing to a resulting lack of
freedom for individuals in a Hobbesian commonwealth, shows instead that individuals
still end up, on Hobbes’s minimalist notion of liberty, with a rather extensive set of
liberties. 
The upshot of Hobbes’s attack on the theorists of republican liberty is thus that they are
wholly mistaken to suppose that we can live as free-men only in free states. On the
contrary, we retain the entirety of our natural liberty even under the most absolute forms
of monarchical sovereignty that can possibly be imagined.28
Skinner notes that Hobbes describes various liberties that we hold onto, including
what to all intents and purposes are what he terms ‘inalienable natural rights’,
describing them as ‘liberties which fall outside the terms of the covenant’.29 Where
I differ from Skinner is, first, in my analysis of Hobbes’s theory of rights, which I see
as more central to his (Hobbes’s) political theory as a whole, and with implications
beyond those mentioned by Skinner. Second, as I argue here, we can find, in
Hobbes’s descriptions of specific rights held by individuals, evidence that he moves
beyond the understanding of liberty as simply the absence of external impediments,
to a more extensive understanding of liberty. So, while Skinner is convinced that
Hobbes really does conceive of liberty as nothing more than the absence of external
physical impediments, I argue that he is using a much broader understanding of
liberty when he discusses the rights of individual subjects within a Hobbesian
commonwealth. 
If one focuses on Hobbes’s theory of rights and the ways in which he discusses
liberty in relation to the rights that we hold and to those we must carry into a
commonwealth, it becomes clear, I shall argue, that Hobbes’s pronouncements on
liberty are not limited to those that follow what I will call the restrictive definition of
liberty, that is, as nothing more than the absence of external impediments. I will
make use of the distinctions made by Michael Goldsmith30 and Annabel Brett31 (in
their discussions of Hobbesian liberty) between the restrictive definition and less
restrictive definitions and show that Hobbes’s descriptions of rights can only be
rendered coherent when such expanded definitions of liberty are used. 
I. HOBBESIAN LIBERTY NOT CONFINED 
TO THE ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL IMPEDIMENTS
My first argument, then, is that Hobbes (in Leviathan) uses not only the notion of
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of external impediments); he also uses the notion of liberty in a broader sense. The
first step in seeing where Hobbes expands on the restrictive definition is set out by
Goldsmith and will be discussed below. The second step, I argue, can be seen by
examining the ways in which Hobbes uses the notion of liberty in his theory of rights
(in Leviathan). Once one looks at the way Hobbes describes the various rights held
by individuals, it becomes clear that he is using a more extensive notion of liberty
than that of the restrictive definition of the absence of ‘externall Impediments of
motion’.32 I shall start with some definitions as a reminder of how Hobbes explicitly
defines both liberty and right, before he expands on each notion.
Hobbes’s Definitions
In Chapter 14 of Leviathan Hobbes defines a right in the following way:
… they that used to speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet
they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare;
Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ
as much as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.33
And in the previous paragraph he defines liberty in the following way: 
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of
externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do
what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his
judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.34
This definition of liberty, as the absence of external impediments to one’s actions, is well
known, as I have mentioned above, infamous even, for its stark vision of human
liberty as nothing more than a purely physical freedom, a lack of being physically
prevented from what I want to do or forbear from doing. The second part of the
definition raises some interesting questions regarding how Hobbes might see the
place of power or capacity in his understanding of liberty.35 In Chapter 21, Of the
LIBERTY of Subjects, he adds the following:
LIBERTY or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by
Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applied no lesse to
Irrationall, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall.36
First, I want to draw attention to Hobbes’s statement of what a right consists in. For
him, a right is a freedom or liberty to do something or to forbear from doing it, and
where there is a right there cannot be an obligation or duty. That is, if I have a right
to φ then I cannot have an obligation or duty not to φ. (It should be noted that this
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is not to say that my right to φ cannot be correlated with a duty on someone else’s
part not to φ; just that it cannot be the case that I have both a right to φ and a duty
not to φ). The significance of this for the present discussion is that Hobbes defines
a right as a liberty and then opposes it to obligation or duty. So, in this sense, liberty
and obligation are opposites or contradictories. This is puzzling in the light of his
definition of liberty as the absence of external impediments, for in what sense can
a lack of external impediments be opposed to obligation? Before I attempt to answer
this question I shall outline Michael Goldsmith’s interpretation of Hobbes’s use of
the term ‘liberty’.
Goldsmith’s Interpretation of Hobbesian Liberty—Freedom from Civil Bonds 
Michael Goldsmith’s interpretation of Hobbesian liberty is justly famous. He
demonstrates that Hobbes uses the term to cover more than just an absence of
physical impediments.37 He points out that in Chapter 21 of Leviathan Hobbes
expands his notion of liberty to include freedom from civil bonds as well as physical
ones. 
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have
made an Artificial Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificial
Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at
one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne
Power; and at the other end to their own Ears.38
Goldsmith analyses this expansion of liberty in the following way: 
Although Hobbes emphasises the absence of physical restraint as the strict core meaning of
liberty, he also allows that humans may be unfree in a different, less strict, extended sense. In
contrasting the circumstances in which a person is unfree with those in which one is not
unfree, Hobbes mentions situations which are described as free because the actor is not
restrained by bonds imposed by law or covenant.39
This allows Hobbes to use liberty to mean freedom from law or even freedom from
obligation, rather than just freedom from physical impediments. The remark
Hobbes makes following that about ‘Artificiall Chains’ (as above) is also interesting;
he says, ‘[T]hese Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made
to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them’.40 We must be
careful here because Hobbes has already denied that actions done from fear are
therefore not performed freely,41 and so we are left with the problem of how we
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should interpret the claim that the bonds of law or obligation can restrict liberty by
danger.
Perhaps the most likely thing that Hobbes has in mind is that in our
deliberations we will factor in the danger of breaking such bonds (of obligation or
law) and choose to restrict our own liberty. He says that in the context of the liberty
of the subject we must consider what ‘liberty we deny ourselves’ when we make a
commonwealth and decide what rights (liberties) we need to give up. Does he now
mean to say that after our initial move to give up and transfer certain rights
(liberties), and once we are living in a commonwealth, we will continue to make
decisions about restricting our liberties in light of the danger to ourselves if we do
not? One advantage of this interpretation is that it does not go against Hobbes’s
insistence that there is no ‘[o]bligation on any man, which ariseth not from some
act of his own’,42 and it also stresses the autonomy of the individual, in calculating
how much danger is posed by the prospect of breaking a law or ignoring an
obligation and then deciding whether and how much to restrict one’s own liberty.
This fits well with the way Hobbes characterises the voluntariness of our actions,
including those that are a response to danger. If one is stuck with the restrictive
definition of liberty, however, this interpretation will not work. How can I deny myself
liberty if liberty is nothing but an absence of external impediments to my actions?
Can I deny myself the absence of a physical impediment—can I deny myself the
absence, say, of a high hedge that prevents me from walking forwards? No, the
hedge denies me that absence, not I. But I can deny myself the freedom I would
have were I to ignore the obligation on me to walk around people’s hedges. Or I
could choose not to deny myself that freedom and cut my way through it. 
With Goldsmith’s extended definition of liberty in mind, I will now look at some
of the actual liberties that Hobbes discusses in the context of his theory of rights;
rights, for example, that Hobbes says we must hold on to when we make the move
from the state of nature to a commonwealth. ‘[T]here be some Rights, which no
man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or
transferred.’43 The aggregate right to self-preservation, which is never given up, is
a right not only to what is necessary to survive but also to ‘the means of so preserving
life as not to be weary of it’.44 This turns out to involve a quite extensive list of
liberties, which are worth considering in the context of the restrictive definition. 
Liberties in the Context of Hobbesian Rights
The liberties Hobbes discusses in the context of his theory of rights are shown to vary
according to the way he defines the rights that individuals have in three different sets
of circumstances:45 liberties which are held in the state of nature (‘a Right to every
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thing; even to one anothers body’46); liberties which are given up or transferred,
under the second law of nature, (‘[t]hat a man be willing, when others are so too,
as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay
down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other
men, as he would allow other men against himselfe’47); and liberties which are held
onto and carried into the commonwealth (‘there be some Rights, which no man
can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or
transferred’;48 ‘every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot
by Covenant be transferred’49).
Skinner argues (as above) that Hobbes turns his back on the rich republican
tradition of liberty and replaces it with the restrictive definition of liberty, which is
quite staggering in its narrowness.50 But Hobbes (although he declares his hostility
to the republican understanding of liberty51) does use (Hobbesian) liberty as the
foundation for the rights that are so central to his argument for government. These
are the rights which he thinks we enter civil society in order the better to exercise—
it is our right to preserve ourselves that lies at the heart of his argument—and they
are the rights for which we become obligated to obey the sovereign. In the Review
and Conclusion of Leviathan he says, of submission to a victor, that individuals
‘contract with the Victor, promising Obedience, for Life and Liberty’.52 It is hard to
see how this use of the notion of liberty by Hobbes can be reconciled with the
restrictive definition of the absence of external impediments. Indeed, it would be
absurd to promise obedience to a victor in return for the absence of external
impediments to one’s actions. 
Hobbes begins his discussion of rights with a description of the right of nature,
as above, according to which ‘every man has a Right to every thing; even to one
anothers body’.53 This untrammelled liberty protects no one and seems to allow
immoral or amoral actions with its lack of restrictions in terms of what actions are
allowable. The right of nature is generally taken as the exemplar of a Hobbesian
right,54 and all rights in the theory are usually defined as or assumed to be
Hohfeldian liberty rights or privileges.55 If all rights in a Hobbesian commonwealth
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are liberty rights, that is, liberties with no correlative duties to protect them, then the
rights he provides are, it is argued, not really rights at all; they are instead ‘mere
freedoms’ or ‘bare liberties’. The addition of’ ‘mere’ and ‘bare’ in front of the word
liberty or freedom has the effect of demeaning the notion of liberty to something
useless and undesirable in a system of political morality; something that gives its
bearers nothing that would improve their lives. This thought is clearly expressed by
John Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights in the following passage:
Pushed as far as Hobbes’s purposes, this contrast between law and rights deprives the
notion of rights of virtually all its normative significance. Hobbes wishes to say that a man
has most rights when he is in the ‘state of nature’, i.e. a vacuum of law and obligation,
since ‘in such a condition, every man has a right to everything (sic); even to one another’s
body’. But we could just as well say that in such a condition of things, where nobody has
any duty not to take anything he wants, no one has any rights.56
One thing to point out here is that Hobbes himself is of course aware of this
implication of the right of nature, and he spells it out in The Elements of Law when
he says, ‘that right of all men to all things, is in effect no better than if no man had
right to any thing. For there is little use and benefit of the right a man hath, when
another as strong, or stronger than himself, hath right to the same’.57 Hobbes does
develop a genuine theory of rights, however, when he describes how individuals
must relinquish the right to every thing of the state of nature, giving up those rights
that they would not wish others to hold against them and taking on duties not to
interfere with the remaining rights that each person holds on to and carries into the
commonwealth.58
For my purposes here, I just want to draw attention to the nature and extent of
the liberty Hobbes describes, when in various places he mentions those rights
(liberties) that must not be given up when we enter a commonwealth. (Of course, it
must be remembered that for Hobbes all rights are liberties, as above.) These
include the liberty to: resist arrest, even when rightfully accused and taken by force;
govern one’s own body; have access to air and water and freedom of movement
(‘waies to go from place to place’); enjoy all things without which one cannot live
well;59 buy and sell and make contracts; choose one’s own abode, one’s own diet,
one’s own trade of life; bring up one’s children as one sees fit; and so on.60
Most of these liberties make no sense if the restrictive definition of liberty as merely
the absence of external impediments is applied. Take the right (liberty), as above,
to resist arrest. Clearly, if a person is being arrested and taken by force, there is not
an absence of physical impediment to her resistance. Indeed, if she is being taken
by force, then she is not physically free to resist that arrest. On the contrary, she is
Blinded by the Light of Hohfeld: Hobbes’s Notion of Liberty 95
56 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) 208.
57 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic in Human Nature and De Corpore Politico (JCA
Gaskin ed) (Oxford University Press, 1994) 80.
58 See Curran (n 45) ch 3.
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being physically forced to move, and so there is a physical impediment to her
standing still. Yet, Hobbes tells us that such a person has ‘the Liberty to disobey’.61
To get to the bottom of what Hobbes means here it is necessary to go back to the
beginning of the quoted passage in Chapter 21, where he says, next to the squib
‘Liberty of Subjects how to be measured’, the following: 
To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to say, what are the
things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without
Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a
Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves.62
Once again, it is difficult to make sense of this on the restrictive definition and even,
in this case, on the extended definition given by Goldsmith, according to which
liberty can be infringed by laws or obligations as well as by physical impediments.
Here, Hobbes says we even have the ‘liberty’ to disobey the law (commands of the
sovereign). 
So, how can we make sense of the actual liberties that Hobbes lists as rights we
hold on to and carry into the commonwealth? In Chapter 21 he gives two categories
of such rights (liberties). First, he tells us that 
[t]he Liberty of a Subject lieth … only in those things, which in regulating their actions,
the sovereign hath praetermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise
contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of
life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.63
It would be very puzzling if by this Hobbes meant that we should be free from
physical impediments to buy and sell and make contracts etc. In this instance we
can use Goldsmith’s extended definition of liberty to include freedom from civil
bonds as well as physical ones. It now makes sense to say that Hobbes means that we
should be free from any laws or obligations that would prevent us from buying and
selling, choosing our own diet etc. 
The second category of rights (liberties) that we continue to hold in the
commonwealth are those rights which, as he has already explained in Chapter 14,
cannot be given up because they are necessary for our preservation in a broad
sense,64 that is, for our own good.65 This category consists in those rights (liberties)
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that remain with each individual into the commonwealth so that ‘every Subject has
Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred’.66
The surprisingly extensive list of liberties Hobbes gives to the individual subject here
includes the following: the right to resist those who assault him, the right to disobey
the sovereign’s command to ‘kill, wound or mayme himself’; the right to disobey a
sovereign command to ‘abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other
thing, without which he cannot live’; the right not to incriminate oneself; the right
to disobey the sovereign’s command to execute any dangerous or dishonourable
office, so long as the refusal does not frustrate the end of the institution of
sovereignty itself (namely peace and security against a common enemy); and, with
the same proviso, the right not to go to war. 
Again, we cannot make sense of these liberties on the restrictive definition, which
would force us to say that when Hobbes declares that there are things ‘which though
commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to
do’,67 he means simply that there are no physical impediments to his refusing. We can
make sense of these liberties, however, on the extended definition, by replacing
physical impediments with the impediments of law or obligation. As Hobbes says,
‘no man … can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe’,68 and even the very
phrases ‘Liberty to disobey’ and ‘Liberty to refuse’ cannot be made sense of in this
context by using the restrictive definition, which would give us ‘no physical
impediments to refusal’ and ‘no physical impediments to disobedience’. 
Annabel Brett—Liberty per se and Natural Liberty
Annabel Brett explains the apparent inconsistency between these uses of ‘liberty’ by
drawing a distinction between what she terms Hobbes’s use of ‘liberty per se’ and
his use of ‘natural liberty’. She argues that it is ‘liberty per se’, or corporeal liberty,
that is the liberty of the definition ‘absence of external impediments’, and which
‘became increasingly important to [Hobbes]’,69 while natural liberty is derived from
the ‘juristic’ conception of liberty and is most clearly explained in The Elements of
Law.70 Brett characterises Hobbes’s account of the latter in the following way: 
An action is within our power to do or not to do, according to Hobbes, for as long as it
is neither impossible nor done. Liberty is formally defined as the liberty to do or not to
do that action; and in the process of decision-making, we habitually put an end to our
own liberty. This deliberation, this relieving ourselves of our liberty, is the process that
results in will:71
and Hobbes uses it to refer to the liberty of nature or the equivalent of the right
of nature. So, natural liberty is the state of liberty we can fall back into if, for
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example, the monarch renounces power.72 It certainly seems difficult to understand
what state of liberty we fall back into, upon the loss of a sovereign with power over
us, if it is purely corporeal liberty he is referring to. Brett suggests that Hobbes does
not quite know how to reconcile these two notions of liberty, and argues that ‘the
problems with liberty in Hobbes’s political theory, which are most obvious in the
famous Chapter 21 of Leviathan, spring from the incompatibility of his two lines of
argument’.73
While I am sympathetic to Brett’s main thesis that Hobbes uses two
understandings of liberty, one of which owes more to the juristic notion of liberty,
I do not follow her in thinking that the use of what she terms ‘natural liberty’ should
be confined to descriptions of the liberties individuals have in the state of nature.
If that were the case, we ought to be able to make sense of Hobbes’s descriptions of
those rights we hold in a commonwealth, using only liberty per se (that is, liberty
understood under the restrictive definition of the absence of external impediments).
Brett’s explanation for why we are unable to do that, is that in Chapter 21, Hobbes’s
‘argument is confused’.74 She says that he wants to say that ‘natural liberty’ has been
given up, but the argument in Chapter 21 leads him to the contradictory position
that a commonwealth is actually ‘a state of natural liberty’.75 She is forced to say that
the inability to explain the liberties he describes in Chapter 21, on the restrictive
definition, is down to ‘Hobbes’ failure completely to separate out corporeal liberty
from natural liberty’.76 I prefer the explanation that, in order to make sense of
Hobbes’s descriptions of the rights (liberties) that we bring with us into the
commonwealth, we need an extended definition of liberty, as I have argued above. 
II. HOHFELD’S CLAIM AS THE ONLY RIGHT 
‘PROPERLY SO CALLED’
My second line of argument concerns the influence that Hohfeld’s analysis of rights
in the legal literature has had on discussions of political (and moral) rights. One
effect of the dominance of the notion of a claim as foundational of a political right
(a dominance that exists both in Hobbes scholarship and in the work of at least
some rights theorists who follow Hohfeld77) has been to push aside the notion of
liberty. This does not happen in the analysis of legal rights, where the Hohfeldian







77 See Introduction, above.
78 See eg Matthew Kramer in Kramer, Simmonds and Steiner (n 12) 11. ‘[A]cts or omissions that are
based on liberties can be protected quite extensively even though the liberties do not themselves
place restrictions on anyone. Not only will a liberty-to-do-φ combine sometimes with a right-to-be-
free-from-interference-with-the-doing-of-φ specifically, but it often combines with other rights—such
as the right to be free from physical assaults—which effectively shield the doing of φ’.
political rights (a good example being discussions of Hobbes’s theory of rights) one
effect of applying the Hohfeldian analysis is that liberties (or privileges as he called
them) are then defined as mere freedoms without any protection (that is, not just
without any directly correlated duties, but without any protection at all), and
therefore not moral or political rights proper, but, we might say, pre-political rights
or even not rights at all. Hampton is a case in point. She thinks that only ‘claim
rights’ can be defined as ‘moral rights’ and that Hobbes’s subjectivist moral theory
means that he only includes ‘liberty rights’ in his political theory, rights which,
having no correlative duties, are on her view not moral rights at all.79
This way of understanding and applying Hohfeld has been particularly striking
in the interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of rights, which, in recent decades, has
been dominated by the interpretation of all Hobbesian rights as Hohfeldian liberty
rights.80 Part of the problem that I am trying to point to is that the Hohfeldian
analysis is sometimes mis-applied in discussions of political rights, inasmuch as
‘liberties’ and ‘claims’ are treated as separate kinds of rights rather than just
different jural relations involving the various ways that rights are treated in law.
For my purposes here, I will concentrate on the broad effect of a common
political analysis of rights, influenced by Hohfeld, according to which liberties are
only seen as being genuine political rights either when they are protected by
surrounding claim rights81 or once they are correlated with duties—and then, of
course, they are no longer liberty rights, but would now be defined as claim rights—
within the Hohfeldian definitional system.82 There has been a longstanding debate
about how well the Hohfeldian analysis does describe rights as we understand them,
with influential arguments against Hohfeld from, for example, Joseph Raz and Neil
MacCormick pitted against muscular defences of the Hohfeldian system as a logical
analysis by Mathew Kramer, Nigel Simmonds and Hillel Steiner.83 Much of this
debate gets entangled in arguments about the applicability of Hohfeld’s definitions
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to actual rights discourse, countered by defences of the logical accuracy of the
Hohfeldian system. I am not intending to enter that debate; rather, I wish to side-
step it by arguing that the notion of liberty, as Hobbes uses it in his theory of rights,
can do some very useful work that the notion of a claim fails to do. (What is more,
and this is merely an aside, there may be implications for public discourse on rights.
One possible result of stressing the correlativity between claims and duties, and of
conceptualising rights purely as claims or entitlements, is that rights will be
crystallised in many people’s minds as special entitlements, rather than as freedoms
held by all.) 
On a Hobbesian theory of rights, the same foundational concept of liberty is
used throughout. By taking natural liberty as its starting point, each individual can
be seen as having, as it were, a complete set of liberties (rights) initially. From this
complete set (that is, on Hobbes’s account, from the state of nature where we have
‘a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body’84) we start a process of giving up
and transferring rights to one another. So, for example, I transfer my right to your
body over to you, not giving you a right you didn’t have before but agreeing to
refrain from any future interference with your right and thereby providing you with
some protection (of your right).85 All such invasive rights must be given up or
transferred, and of our remaining rights we must also decide which ones we must
not or cannot give up or transfer. These will be those rights ‘without which a man
cannot live, or not live well’.86 So, curtailments of our freedom will only be
acceptable if they do not harm our ability to live or, indeed, to live well. 
There is an elegance and simplicity to this way of seeing rights: elegance because
the foundational notion of liberty is used throughout, and simplicity because the use
of the notion of liberty attaches each right firmly to its holder and keeps it separate
from any accompanying duties of others. It also makes the starting point of rights
each individual’s desire for freedom rather than claims on the duties of others. My
argument is that the notion of liberty, as used by Hobbes, (in an extended way rather
than according to the restrictive definition) captures an important aspect of what we
understand in everyday discourse about rights, and allows us to find more flexible
and simple ways of discussing political and moral rights and their protection. For
example, in Hobbes’s theory of rights, by using the notion of liberty to define a
right, he is able to discuss a range of rights—from the unrestricted and unprotected
freedoms of the state of nature to the inalienable and somewhat protected rights
held within a commonwealth. The protection or lack of protection for each right
can be incorporated into the description of that right (liberty). In other words, it
differs from a (mis)application of a Hohfeldian analysis (of liberties and claims),
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according to which the right itself will be defined according to its protection or lack
thereof. On that interpretation of a Hohfeldian analysis, if it lacks protection of any
sort then it will be a (bare) liberty right. If it is protected by the duties of others
then it will be a (moral/political) claim right. 
I should make it clear that I am not trying to dispute the logical accuracy or the
analytical brilliance of Hohfeld’s scheme as an analysis of legal rights. Rather, I am
arguing, first, against his proposal that the ‘claim right’ is the only one of his
definitions that may properly be called a right, and, second, that the resulting
tendency among some writers discussing political rights (such as those discussing
Hobbes’s theory of rights) to assume or argue that all political rights are claim rights,
restricts those discussions in an unhelpful way. It is in the application of a
Hohfeldian analysis to discussions of political rights that these sorts of problems arise.
Hohfeld’s analysis is designed to explain the treatment of relations between people,
by the law, in situations where we can say, broadly, that their legal rights are affected.
In this analysis a person’s power to change her legal position, for example in relation
to a will, are included, while such rights have no specific importance in discussions
of political rights. And, as I have said, in the legal analysis, liberty rights exist within
a context of surrounding claim rights, and so are never, as it were, wholly
unprotected.
Before I can discuss these arguments in any more detail, some definitions might
be useful. According to the Hohfeldian analysis of rights in the legal literature, the
word ‘right’ can be used in four ways. It can refer to a claim, a privilege (or liberty),
a power, or an immunity. It is only the first of these, a claim, that is really deserving
of the title ‘right’, according to Hohfeld, because it describes ‘that legal relation
which is most properly called a right or claim’87 and which is ‘a right in the strictest
sense’88. The four categories of legal relations involving rights are each shown to
have legal correlatives and legal opposites (or contradictories), and for my purposes
here I only need two categories of right, or uses of the term ‘right’, namely that of
a claim and that of a liberty (or privilege), as set out in the table below. 
Hohfeldian Analysis of Claim Right and Liberty Right (or Privilege)
Claim correlatives Duty
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So, a claim on the part of X re A is always correlated with a duty on the part of at
least one other (ie a duty to allow or provide or help, such as the duty of Y to allow
X A, or help X to have A, or to give X A), and the contradictory of X’s claim right
re A is that X does not have a no-right (ie no claim) re A. And a liberty on the part
of X re A is correlated with a no-right of someone re A (ie Y, say, has no claim that
X should not have A or do A), and the contradictory of X’s liberty re A is that X has
no duty to do A or have A or to not do A.
An example might stick better in the mind. If I have a right to walk down my
garden, then I am free to walk down my garden and it cannot be the case that I have
a duty to not walk down my garden. So, there is the absence of an obligation (I am
using duty and obligation interchangeably) not to walk down my garden and a
freedom/liberty to do so. So far, there is no mention of any protection for this right.
In other words, it is not the case that any or all other people are under an obligation
to allow me to walk down it/not interfere with my walking down it. This is what Hohfeld
defines as a liberty right (or privilege). On the other hand, if Y appears in my
garden, she does not have a right to walk down it and I have a right that she should
not do so. I have a right to my garden against Y such that she has a duty to stay out
of it (unless I have invited her in or opened it up to the public to view my beautiful
flowers). This is what Hohfeld defines as a claim. So, my claim to my garden is
correlated with everyone else’s duty to stay out of it. 
When we are talking about legal rights, it can be seen that such rights are often
bundles of different Hohfeldian rights, such as above, where I have (at least) liberty
rights and claim rights in relation to my garden. But when political or moral rights
are being discussed (and it is now accepted by many that the Hohfeldian analysis
applies to political rights as well as to legal rights)89 then it is usually the claim right
alone that is taken to be properly called a right. A consequence of this is that only
rights which have directly correlative duties are deemed rights in a political sense,
and rights which do not have such duties, for example what Hohfeld calls privileges
and most commentators refer to as liberty rights, as they lack such correlative duties,
cannot be deemed full rights in a political sense. As I mentioned above, Jean
Hampton, in her analysis of Hobbesian rights, is a good example of this. Another is
Claire Finkelstein, who, in discussing Hobbes’s right to self-defence, says, ‘[f]or
Hobbes’ right to self-defense is a mere liberty right, rather than a fully-fledged claim right.
That is, it is a right that places no one under a correlative duty of non-
interference’.90
That is one aspect of the problem; a set of rights, such as my right to walk down
my garden (at least when discussed as a moral or political right rather than as a legal
right), fall out of the definition of a (full moral or political) right, on this view.
Another aspect of the problem is that instead of discussing and understanding moral
or political rights as freedoms or liberties, we discuss and understand moral and
political rights only as claims.
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CONCLUSION: LIBERTIES NOT CLAIMS SHOULD 
BE THE FOUNDATION FOR RIGHTS
I agree with Mathew Kramer when he says that Hohfeld’s analysis of rights, into the
eight ‘incidents’ or relations of legal correlatives and legal ‘opposites’ or
contradictories, is stipulative and definitional in nature and, therefore, cannot be
challenged with empirical counterexamples.91 But when Hohfeld states that a
‘claim’ with its correlate duty is ‘that legal relation most properly called a right’92 he
has moved beyond stipulative definition; now he is saying something substantive.
In other words, when he declares that of the four uses of the term ‘right’ in his
analytical scheme (namely, claim, privilege or liberty, power and immunity) it is
‘claim’ that most successfully captures what we mean by ‘a right’, he has turned from
stipulative definition to substantive analysis. He is now commenting on the way in
which the term ‘right’ is used and understood in rights discourse, and he might be
going even further and saying something about the place of a right within a system
of political values. It could of course be argued that Hohfeld means to say nothing
more than ‘a claim is what we most often refer to when talking about legal rights’.
I think it is more likely, however, that what lies behind these statements is the
thought that in discussions of people’s rights (moral and political as well as legal),
the notion of a right is often closely associated with the idea that others should
respect that right; that there are duties that are correlated with a right. This also
echoes an older argument in moral theory, namely, that rights are nothing more
than what is implied by certain duties.93
My disagreement is with this substantive analysis, not with the stipulative
definitions and the logical relations between them. I am suggesting that Hobbes’s
use of liberty, rather than claim, to define a right—(‘right consisteth in liberty to do
or to forbeare’94) enables him to describe rights using the very broad category of
freedom, including freedoms we should not have (from a moral or political point of
view); as well as to describe rights that are unprotected, protected by correlative
duties, or protected indirectly (that is, we can talk about the protection of rights much
more broadly than we can if we are restricted to using the notion of a claim). 
There is not the space here to provide what would be needed in order to argue
in any detail for the use of the notion of liberty, rather than that of claim, to ground
the notion of a (moral or political) right. I have only been able to gesture towards
some reasons why this might be profitable. By using liberty as our foundational
concept for rights, we are able to talk about rights more broadly and without being
tied into the correlativity of duties. Applying the Hohfeldian analysis, on the other
hand, in the way it is employed in the examples given above, restricts us to
describing only those rights that are claims correlated with duties to protect them,
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and precludes, I argue, a number of liberties that we might think of as rights. I hope
I have demonstrated something of the elegance and simplicity of Hobbes’s use of
the notion of liberty to define a right and also something of the flexibility of liberty
when used as the foundational notion for a right. Equally, I have tried to show that
when moral and political philosophers take the Hohfeldian ‘claim’ to be
foundational for our notion of a (moral and political) right they are restricting
themselves in ways that may be unhelpful. Putting these two lines of argument
together suggests that it might be worth exploring the possibility that while dividing
off the notion of liberty from that of a claim may be very useful when dealing with
rights in the legal literature, it is perhaps less so when addressing moral and political
rights.
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